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1 Introduction 
 
Oil has been the leading source of energy since early in the twentieth century, due to 
its perceived benefits vis-à-vis other types of energy. These relate to accessibility, 
transportability, versatility and low costs, and as a consequence of all these, its established 
infrastructure right across the supply chain. The development of the industry has gone hand-
in- hand with that of the global economy, to the benefit, principally, of what are now seen as 
the advanced consumer societies.  
Price of oil is following a pricepath which was first analyzed by Hotelling and later a 
lot of extensions were added to it. The real price development shows casual outcomes and 
considerable deviation from the theoretical price. In this thesis I will summarize the most 
important theory elements, give some outlines on historical development of oil market, 
formation of price system, economical fundamentals of oil market and oil extraction on 
Norwegian continental shelf. At the end I will compare volume for Norwegian oil production 
over time and price level for the same years and will make evaluation how ―successful‖ or 
―unsuccessful‖ Norway has been in relation to the price development and how the price 
development has been in relation to the expectation when the exploration just started.    
The current oil situation may be succinctly described as follows. On the demand side 
growth in the period beginning in the mid-1970s until 2004 has been lacklustre. Thus oil 
consumption increased from 55990 million barrels per day (mb/d) in 1974 to 80,76 mb/ in 
2006
1
, at an average annual compound rate of 1,19 percent. In the same period world primary 
energy consumption grew from 6,07 billion tonnes of oil equivalent (toe) in 1974 to 10,2 
billion toe in 2006, that is at an average annual compound rate of 1,8 percent. The growth rate 
differential implies that the share of oil in the energy slate has been declining during this 
period. The change was from an oil share of about 45 percent in 1974 to 36 percent in 2006. 
The shift in shares was largely due to the substitution of fuel oil by coal, gas, nuclear and 
hydro in power generation and steam-raising in industry; and of middle distillates by natural 
gas in other applications. Oil retained however its dominance in the transport sector, the area 
where technological developments are most critical to its future.  
The determinants of oil demand are income (the rate of economic growth), price, the 
technology of oil using vehicles and appliances, changes in consumers’ tastes which are partly 
correlated to income, government energy policies and the availability of competitive 
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substitutes for uses where substitution is technically feasible. Demand for oil is the highest in 
OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development) countries both in absolute 
terms and per capita. However, the growth in oil demand has been relatively low in OECD 
countries and much higher in the developing world, particularly in the new industrialized 
countries of Asia. 
On the supply side, the changes in the OPEC (Organization of The Petroleum 
Exporting Countries) share of global oil production went through a cycle in the period 1974-
2004. Significant increases in non-OPEC production at a time when world demand was either 
stagnant or growing very slightly were accommodated by an equivalent reduction in OPEC’s 
output. The reason is that non-OPEC producers are volume maximizers while OPEC, having 
assumed the role of defending an administered price (between 1973 and 1985), became the 
residual oil supplier to the world. Thus OPEC’s production share which stood at about 52 
percent in 1974 was as low as 30,7 percent in 1986, but then recovered to 41 percent in 2006.  
Important changes also occurred in the regional structure of non-OPEC production in 
the past 30 years. The second half of the 1970s saw the arrival of new producers, the most 
significant being the UK and Norway in North Sea, Mexico and Alaska. Oil production in the 
USSR increased until the early 1980s reaching a peak of 12,520 mb/d in 1983. A huge decline 
set in after the brake-up of Soviet Union, with oil production of the FSU falling to 7,035 mb/d 
in 1996.  
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2 The oil market  
 
2.1 Historical perspective of the oil market 
 
The use of oil as a source of energy is a recent phenomenon. The beginning of the oil 
industry is usually dated to 1859 when in Pennsylvania an oil well was struck instead of brine 
(Jones, 1988), but oil seepages have been known and taken advantage of for much of human 
history and in as various parts of the world as China, the Roman Empire, and Brazil in 
precolonial times (Van Meurs, 1981). 
The oil industry and the uses of oil developed first and foremost in the United States, 
and it was one of the main engines of the rapid industrialization and growth of the American 
economy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Oil quickly became important 
enough to shape world political events. Intense rivalry developed between the Germans and 
the British in the late nineteenth century in their diplomatic approaches toward Turkey, but 
Turkey then held sway over the Middle East, parts of which appeared to be promising for oil 
exploitation. After World War I and the disintegration of the Turkish empire Iraq and Kuwait, 
soon to emerge as important oil producers, came under British influence. The Shah of Iran 
was put in power by the British and American governments because of interruptions in oil 
supplies from Iran under the government of Mossadeq in the early 1950s. The Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait in 1990 was rolled back, mainly through the efforts of the United States, 
undoubtedly because of the threat it represented to the supplies of oil from the Middle East 
(Hannesson, 1998).  
The price of oil has shown a peculiar behaviour over time. Figure 2.1 shows how the 
price of oil has developed since the early beginnings of the industry, in nominal and real 
terms. Real prices are computed by dividing the nominal price in a given month by the ratio 
of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) in that month to the CPI in some "base" period. All real 
prices are expressed in "current" dollars and any current month price may be compared 
directly with any past or projected real prices. The 1950s and 1960s were a period of 
relatively stable and declining real price of oil. The early 1970s, particularly 1973-74, mark a 
watershed. Since then the oil price has been subject to three major shifts; it rose dramatically 
in 1973-75 and again in 1979-81, and fell steeply in 1986. Since 2005 and during 2008 prices 
reached record-breaking levels in nominal and real terms 
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There are a few peculiarities that are important for understanding the movements in 
the price of oil. First, the oil industry is dominated by a few large companies. This was 
particularly true in the past when the oil companies cooperated in setting their prices. Second, 
because oil is a storable commodity, the oil market is highly influenced by expectations about 
future prices and changes in inventories (Hannesson, 1998). 
    Figure 2.1 The price of Crude Oil 1861-2007 
 
    Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration 
 
 The steady decline in the oil price that persisted for much of the first quarter of a 
century after the end of World War II took place despite a steadily rising demand for oil. That 
the price of oil fell was due to two factors. First, sufficient oil was discovered to replace the 
increasing quantities that were used up. Second, the new reserves that were found were to an 
increasing degree controlled by ―independent‖ oil companies, independent, that is, of the 
international giants that controlled the great reserves in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere and 
cooperated in exploiting them. 
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2.2 Formation of the price system 
 
 Since the beginning of the oil era in the Middle East until the early 1970s, 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) did not participate in production or 
pricing of crude oil but simply received a stream of income through royalties and income 
taxes. OPEC consisted of thirteen countries, including Iran, seven Arab countries, plus 
Ecuador, Indonesia, Nigeria, Angola and Venezuela. OPEC had been formed on 14 
September, 1960 at the Baghdad conference. It was made to protest pressure by major oil 
companies (mostly owned by US, British, and Dutch nationals) to reduce oil prices and 
payments to producers. At first it had operated as an informal bargaining unit for the sale of 
oil by Third World nations.  
The oil pricing regime associated with the concession system that prevailed in the 
Third World until the mid 1970s was centred on the concept of ―posted price‖. The posted 
price served only as a fiscal parameter which was used to calculate the royalty and income tax 
per barrel of crude oil going to the host governments (Mabro, 1984).  Spot prices, transfer 
prices and long-term contract prices could not play such a fiscal role.  
Until the late 1950s, the international oil industry outside the USA, Canada, the USSR 
and China has been characterized by the dominant position of the large multinational oil 
companies (known as the Seven Sisters or the majors) which had majority control of reserves, 
extraction and production, transportation and marketing.The Seven Sisters consisted of three 
companies formed by the breakup by the US Government of Standard Oil, along with four 
other major oil companies. With their dominance of oil production, refinement and 
distribution, they were able to take advantage of the rapidly increasing demand for oil and 
turn immense profits. They controlled the rate of supply of crude oil through joint ownership 
of companies that operated in different countries.  The Seven Sisters were comfortable with 
the system of posted prices because it maintained their oligopolistic position, and until the late 
1960s the OPEC was too weak to change the existing pricing regime. It was only when the 
Arab states began to gain control over oil prices and production, mainly through the formation 
of OPEC, beginning in 1960 and really gaining power by the 1970s, that the Seven Sisters' 
influence declined (Mabro, 2006). 
Around 1970 there were signs that the era of slowly falling real oil prices was coming 
to an end. The price rose in the early 1970s. Even if more oil was found than was being used 
up, these discoveries were distributed in a lopsided fashion. Most of these discoveries and the 
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ones that were easiest to exploit were located in the Middle East. The countries in Western 
Europe imported most of their oil from the Middle East and United States was becoming 
dependent on imports from this source (Parra, 2004). Consequently, disruption in supply from 
the Middle East could be expected to have a major impact on the world oil market. OPEC was 
becoming aware of this and was adopting a more aggressive stance in its negotiations with the 
international oil companies about posted prices, on which the tax payments to the 
governments of the oil-producing countries were based.  
 The war between Israel and Egypt in October 1973 precipitated dramatic increase in 
oil prices. On 16 October 1973, the six Gulf Members of OPEC announced an immediate 
increase in the posted price of the Arabian Light crude from $3,65 to $5,119. The Arab 
countries imposed an oil embargo on the United States and the Netherlands, in order to put 
pressure on Western governments because of their support of Israel. The oil embargo was 
over quickly, but what had become evident was the power the oil-exporting countries wielded 
over the price of oil. In December 1973, OPEC raised the posted price of the Arabian Light to 
$11.651. This jump in price was unprecedented. The year 1973 represented a dramatic shift in 
this balance of power towards OPEC. For the first time in its history, OPEC assumed a 
unilateral role in setting posted prices (Terzian, 1985). 
 The oil industry witnessed a major transformation in the early 1970s when some 
OPEC governments stopped granting new concessions and started to claim equity 
participation in the existing concessions. Equity participation gave OPEC governments a 
share of the oil produced which they had to sell to third-party buyers. This led to the 
introduction of new pricing concepts to deal with this new reality (Mabro, 1984). As owners 
of crude oil, governments had to set a price for third-party buyers. Here entered the concept of 
official selling price (OSP) or government selling price (GSP). The complex oil price regime 
of the early 1970s centred on three different concept of oil prices (posted, OSP, and buyback 
prices) was highly inefficient.  
 Equity participation and nationalization of oil resources affected the structure of the oil 
industry and led to the emergence of a market for crude oil. As a result of these developments, 
multinational oil companies lost large reserves of crude oil and they found themselves net 
short and dependent on OPEC supplies. This encouraged the development of an oil market 
outside the inter-multinational oil companies’ trade and pushed companies to diversify their 
sources of oil supply by gaining access and developing reserves outside OPEC. This process 
began well before the 1970s. In 1969, oil was found in the Norwegian sector and in 1970  
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a major find (the Ekofisk field) was confirmed. In the UK sector in 1970, BP drilled the 
exploratory well that found the Forties field. One year later, Shell-Esso discovered the Brent 
field (Parra, 2004). 
 During the years 1975-78, OPEC countries consolidated their control over production, 
prices and investment. 
 In the 1979 the second oil crisis occurred in the wake of the Iranian Revolution. The 
new regime resumed oil exports, it was inconsistent and at a lower volume, forcing prices to 
go up. Saudi Arabia and other OPEC nations increased production to offset the decline, and 
the overall loss in production was about 4 percent. 2 
In 1980, following the Iraqi invasion of Iran, oil production in Iran nearly stopped, and 
Iraq's oil production was severely cut as well. After 1980, oil prices began a six-year decline 
that culminated with a 46 percent price drop in 1986. This was due to reduced demand and 
over-production. Significant amounts of oil began to reach the international market from 
outside OPEC. Between 1975 and 1985 non-OPEC countries managed to increase their share 
of world total oil production from 48% in 1973 to 71% in 1985 (EIA, 2007). Most of increase 
in oil came from Mexico, the North Sea, and Soviet Union (Parra, 2004).  
The OPEC-administrated oil pricing regime lasted until 1985. The demand for OPEC 
oil declined from a yearly average of 16 mb/d in 1985 with Saudi Arabia’s production falling 
from a yearly average of 9,9 mb/d in 1980 to around a yearly average of 3,4 mb/d in 1985.3 
With this continued decline in demand for its oil, OPEC saw its own market share in the 
world’s oil production fall from 52% in 1973 to less than 30% in 1985. 
 Saudi Arabia adopted the netback pricing system in 1986 in order to restore both the 
$26 price level and the country’s market share (Mabro, 1986). The netback pricing system 
provided oil companies with a guaranteed refining margin even if oil priced were to collapse. 
The price formula was equal to the ex-post product realization minus refining and 
transportation costs. The netback pricing system resulted in the 1986 price collapse, from $26 
a barrel in 1985 to less than $10 a barrel in mid-1986. 
 After the collapse of the OPEC-administrated system and the short experiment with 
netback pricing, oil-exporting countries adopted market-related pricing. First adopted by the 
Mexican national oil company PEMEX in 1986, market-related pricing received acceptance 
among many oil-exporting countries and by 1988 it became and still is the main method for 
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 "Oil Squeeze", Time magazine (1979-02-05). 
 
3
 Source of data is EIA 
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pricing crude oil in international trade. Its structure is based on formula pricing were the 
reference price is derived from the market rather than being the administered OPEC marker 
price. This led to the development of a complex structure of oil markets which consist of spot, 
physical forward, futures, options and other derivative markets. Such a complex structure 
emerged in the North Sea around Brent. In the early 1980s, the Brent market only consisted of 
the spot market and the informal forward physical market (the 15-day market). By the late 
1980s, the Brent market had become quite complex including also a futures contract traded on 
the International Petroleum Exchange (IPE), options, swaps and other trading instruments 
(Mabro, 2006).  In North America, other complex layers of trading instruments emerged 
around the West Texas Intermediate (WTI).  
 
2.3 Formula pricing in the current oil pricing regime 
 
The emergence and expansion of the market for crude oil allowed the development of 
market-referencing pricing off spot crude markers such as spot WTI, dated Brent and Dubai. 
Formula pricing which constitutes the basis of the current ―market-related‖ oil pricing regime 
is a relatively recent development in the oil market. First adopted by the Mexican national oil 
company PEMEX in 1986, formula pricing received wide acceptance among many oil-
exporting countries and by 1988 it became and still is main method for pricing crude oil in 
international trade (Mabro, 2006). 
Long-term contracts constitute the main method for arranging physical delivery of oil 
in this system. These contracts are negotiated directly between the parties and they specify 
among other things, the volumes of crude oil to be delivered, the actions to be taken in case of 
default, the tolerance level and the method used in calculating crude oil prices. The formula 
used in pricing oil is straightforward. The price of a certain variety of crude oil is set as a 
differential to a certain marker or reference price. Specifically for crude oil variety X, the 
formula pricing is: 
                                                PX = PR + D, 
Where PX is the price of crude X, PR is the reference or marker price and D is the value of 
the price differential. 
 The differential, also called the coefficient of adjustment, determined independently 
by each of the oil-producing countries, is usually set in the month preceding the loading 
month, and adjusted monthly or quarterly (Parra, 2004). Theoretically, the differential is 
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supposed to reflect differences in the quality of crude. The differential between the different 
varieties of crude oil is not constant over time and changes continuously according to relative 
demand and the relative supplies of the various crudes which in turn depend on the relative 
prices of petroleum products. Oil-exporting countries that announce their differentials first are 
at a competitive disadvantage of being undercut by their closest competitors. This can induce 
them to delay the announcement of the differential or in the case of multiple transactions 
compensate the buyers with adjusting downwards the differential in the next rounds. 
 There is also a time lag problem. When there is a lag between the date at which a 
cargo is bought and the date of arrival at its destination, there is a price risk. Oil-exporting 
countries usually share this risk with their buyers through the pricing formula. Agreements are 
sometimes made for the date of pricing to occur around the delivery date. The price used is 
the market price quotes averaged over 10 days around the delivery date. For oil sold to the Far 
East, the pricing is the average of the reference price over the calendar month in which 
loading took place (James, 2003).  
 The next important element of formula pricing is identification of the reference or 
benchmark crude. Brent, WTI and Dubai-Oman are the main crude oil benchmarks of the 
current oil pricing regime. Nearly all oil traded outside America and the Far East is priced 
using Brent as a benchmark. Brent Blend is a combination of crude oil from different oil 
fields located in the North Sea. WTI is the main benchmark used for pricing oil imports into 
the USA. Although more crude oil is priced off Brent, the standard WTI futures contract is the 
most widely traded commodity futures contract in the world. West Texas Intermediate (WTI) 
crude oil is of very high quality. Dubai-Oman is used as a benchmark for Gulf crudes (Saudi 
Arabia, Iran, Iraq, the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait) sold in the Asia-Pacific market (Mabro, 
2006). Initially, Dubai became the main price marker for the region by default as it was one of 
the few Gulf crudes available for sale on the spot market.  
 With a large fraction of traded crude oil being priced off Brent, Brent price takes a 
privileged position within the current oil pricing regime. In the early 1980s the volume of 
production in the Brent market was quite large and ensured enough physical liquidity. But 
similar bases of physical liquidity could be found in other regions of the world, especially in 
OPEC which constituted the largest physical market for crude oil to question the choice of 
Brent price as a marker. Thus, the volume of production though important is not the 
determining factor for the choice of a marker.  
 Because the international benchmarks are differentiated by the type of crude oil and its 
location, they fetch different prices. WTI is lighter and sweeter than Brent and as a result of 
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these gravity and sulphur differences WTI typically trades at a dollar or two dollars premium 
to Brent. The price differential between the international benchmarks, also known as spreads, 
however are not fixed and can widen or narrow in response to factors other than differences in 
the intrinsic properties of the crude (Mabro, 2006). Movements in oil price differentials can 
result from non-parallel movements of either of the underlying benchmark prices or both. The 
nonparallel movements are possible because each type of crude oil can be influenced by local 
conditions, the set of traders in the market, their perceptions of the oil crude market. This may 
lead sometimes to wide spreads between the benchmarks.  
 
 
2.4 Market developments and marketing strategies for crude oil 
 
The oil derivative markets have developed around two complementary axes: 
hedging oil prices exposures of large companies, and the financing operations of the oil 
industry. Both of these have generated rapid growth for the over-the-counter (OTC) 
energy derivatives industry. For the last ten years, the OTC market has also fuelled much 
of the growth in liquidity in the exchanges, especially for back-month trading (Kaminski, 
2004).  
 The physical crude market is the foundation of the oil market. Prices of crude are 
generally quoted free on board (fob) at their loading port. Most physical crude oil is 
priced as a differential to an actively traded future or forward marked (Kaminski, 2004). 
Instead of buyer and seller agreeing an absolute price for the cargo of crude oil, they agree 
floating price, which is generally an average of several days around the bill of lading date 
(when the ship loads the oil). Most oil traded in Europe and many West African crudes, 
for example, are priced against Brent while almost all crude exported to the US, or traded 
within it, is priced against Nymex futures (Kaminski, 2004). In the short-term, the crude 
oil market is the trendsetter for the other energy markets; it is highly sensitive to OPEC 
rhetoric, to the general economic environment and to political events or uncertainties.  
 It is the composition and structure of the underlying physical Brent market that 
accounts for much of its importance. The upstream tax regulations in the UK give 
integrated companies producing oil an incentive to trade arm’s length in order to establish 
an independent and market-related price. As a result, there is always a large amount of oil 
available to the market, thus guaranteeing the market’s liquidity. Since the blend can be 
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traded to within a few days of physical delivery, the Brent market fills an essential gap in 
the term structure of the world oil market by providing a price reference over a period of 
one to two months ahead (Kaminski, 2004). Finally, because North Sea crudes are 
generally light and sweet, they are attractive to any refiner if the price is right.  
 The importance of the physical oil market in the North Sea has encouraged the 
development of active and liquid paper markets. WTI, on the other hand, is the leading 
benchmark for the US domestic crude market and the physical underlying of the deepest 
commodity futures market in the world. Unlike the North Sea, virtually every barrel of US 
domestic crude, with the exception of Alaskan North Slope (ANS), is traded, priced and 
transported by pipeline rather than on waterborne tankers and barges (Kaminski, 2004).  
 The main instruments of the crude oil market are futures, forwards or swaps based 
on WTI and Brent indices. Cargoes of Brent blend crude oil are traded on an active 
forward market, so that one cargo may change hands many times before it is finally 
collected from Sullom Voe, its loading terminal (Kaminski, 2004).  
A forward contract requires the seller to give the buyer 15 day’s notice of physical 
lifting dates. Once a cargo has been nominated, it is known as a ―dated cargo‖, and 
specific loading dates are attached to it. Many types of physical crude oil are priced 
against dated Brent (Kaminski, 2004). Flat price risks are hedged using IPE Brent 
contracts and the differential between dated Brent and the first future contract are traded 
through ―contracts for differences‖ (CFDs). CFDs normally refer to calendar weeks; this 
means that the unwinding of these swaps takes place using Platt’s quotations for the 
relevant Monday to Friday period.  
 Crude oil is also the index of choice for most arbitrageurs and investment funds, 
since it is by far the most liquid of all energy markets. The demand generated by 
investment strategists for derivative funds has been growing at an impressive pace in 
terms of variety and volume. Short-term oil and natural gas futures prices are heavily 
affected by the trading decisions of large financial entities, including Wall Street 
investment banks and hedge funds. Investment transactions, which can be either private 
placements or public offerings such as warrants, allow financiers to assume trading 
positions that are indexed to oil without the bother and risk of directly managing a 
commodities desk. Because of their liquidity, and hence the relatively low-cost dynamic 
hedging they allow, futures markets for crude oil have seen the creation of many financia l 
structured products of increasing complexity: range swaps, index-amortising swaps, 
corridors, etc. (Kaminski, 2004).  This activity, however, requires the development of 
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specific distribution channels that offer access to institutional, retail and private clients. 
The driving force behind any offering of structured product is investor demand, which is 
itself triggered by specific market configurations and proprietary views. 
 The market in long-term price management for financing purposes is dominated by 
natural gas and crude oil. The OTC market contracts with maturities of as long as 10 
years, but specific risks are attached to such transaction. Positions may have to be ―rolled 
over‖ on the longest available terms. Physical considerations have to be taken into account 
as well. For example, the production of both Brent and WTI is expected to decline over 
the years, and therefore they may become less effective as representative markers; in 
particular, lower production rates might make price easier to manipulate (James, 2003). 
The Brent and Ninian fields have already been mixed, with a limited loss of quality, to 
form Brent Blend. However, some traders (and even Saudi Arabia) are pushing for the 
replacement of Brent by Forties which has a large ownership structure involving 40 
companies and whose production has been rising sharply as new fields such as Scott and 
Nelson have been brought into the blend. In the case of WTI, there is still no real 
alternative crude (Pegado, 1989). Companies with very long-term derivatives indexed on 
WTI and Brent may have to negotiate on fallback indices, and quality differentials, or 
make use of early termination clauses.  
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2.5 The economic fundamentals of the crude oil markets 
 
The short-term equilibrium of the oil market (production and consumption 
capacities are considered to be fixed) can be inferred from Figure 2.2 below.  
Figure 2.2. Supply/demand picture of the oil market 
 
             
 Source: Kaminski, 2004 
 
The supply curve is the histogram of total production costs for the existing oil 
fields and displays economic rents due to the relative ease of extraction of crude oil and 
the proximity to refining centers. The basic marginal cost of Middle East oil production is 
approximately US$2/bbl, compared to US$11/bbl in Canada and the North Sea, and 
US$14/bbl in Siberia (Kaminski, 2004). Neither supply nor demand are particularly 
responsive to changes in price in the short run. In some of its uses, such as transportation, 
oil still has no effective substitute. Moreover, since oil demand usually magnifies 
economic growth, the vertical curve on Figure 2.2 is liable to move violently to the left or 
to the right over the course of few months time. 
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In purely competitive market, when production or transportation capacities are 
close to saturation and demand soars, oil prices would need to reach a fairly high level 
before return forces became effective. At the onset, a price hike is self-realising as it 
triggers a cautionary demand for stocks, which in turn enhances the original imbalance. 
Return forces include substitution to coal or natural gas in power stations, a marginal 
increase in production for wells with flexibility in supply volumes or public measures for 
energy conservation (Hannesson, 1998). Price hikes are a strong incentive to invest in new 
production facilities and so cannot be sustained indefinitely. Because of the time required 
to put new fields on stream, they usually result in an over-capacity in E&P sector one to 
two years later.   
Inversely, when production exceeds consumption, stocks usually build up and the 
situation may degenerate into a price war if, in the absence of agreement between 
producing countries, any one of them tries to expand its market share at the expense of the 
others (Mabro, 2006). Since the oil industry is capital-intensive, if the market were 
completely free, reductions in output should happen only when prices fall below the 
operating costs of marginal units. When this level is reached, exploration programmes are 
scaled down, wells are ultimately shut in and the demand side benefits from substitution 
in favour of oil.  
In a competitive market, prices should fluctuate wildly between an upper and lower 
zone whose limits are determined by purely economic constraints.  
However, this is not quite the case. The Middle East contains two third of the 
world’s proven reserves and it produces approximately a third of total consumption. Most 
importantly, production is significantly cheaper and more flexible in this region than 
almost anywhere else in the world. This allows the main producers (Saudi Arabia, Iran 
UAE, Iraq, Kuwait, etc) to operate ―swing capacities‖ that can be closed well before 
prices drop below the variable costs of marginal units, and reactivated when demand 
suddenly peaks (Kaminski, 2004). Since such a strategy has a cost (stopping facilities 
when they could still be operated at a profit), there must be a collective reward for its 
implementation. This reward is the extra profits gained by low-cost producing countries 
when they maintain the oil price above ―a purely competitive level‖ , at which level 
owners of the best oil fields would enjoy only small rents as compared to owners of good 
oil fields (Kaminski, 2004). 
However, OPEC is no longer able to prop up oil prices indefinitely. Due to 
advances in geology and drilling techniques, the cost of finding and developing new 
  
15 
reserves outside the Middle East has been significantly reduced over the past 20 years. As 
a result price takers in the industry (international oil companies and minor to medium-size 
producing countries) have lowered the minimum level at which it is economically sensible 
for them to develop new reserves. The resulting situation is summarised in Figure 2.3.  
Figure 2.3 A dynamic view of the supply/demand equilibrium  
in OPEC and non-OPEC countries. 
 
 
 
Source: Kaminski, 2004 
 
The ―dynamic consumption curve‖ relates the rate increase of worldwide 
consumption to the long-term oil price: it shifts to the right when economic growth 
increases; it is bounded upward by the price of substitutes and thus becomes flatter when 
alternative technologies find their way to the market. The ―dynamic supply curve‖ (02) 
gives the rate of increase of oil output at a given market price if low-cost producing 
countries decide to satisfy consumption increments entirely on their own, without any 
agreement between them. The ―dynamic supply curve‖ (01) is identical to (02), except 
that it assumes that new developments are carried out only by means of price takers’ 
reserves. 
This defines an economic range of prices where low-cost producing countries can 
attempt to stabilize the market price of oil by varying the development rate of their own 
(01) 
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reserves (Hannesson, 1998). The floor of this range would be reached only if low-cost 
participants were acting on a purely competitive basis; below this level, an oil shock 
would be inevitable. On the contrary, if they tried to impose a market price above the 
ceiling of the range, new developments in the oil industry would only take place in the 
price takers’ reserves and OPEC’s market share would steadily decrease. Various studies 
have estimated these boundaries at US$5/bbl and US$25/bbl respectively.  
From an economic standpoint, there is thus an ―equilibrium range‖ wherein 
political factors can durably exert their influence on oil prices. By political factors, means 
factors that have no immediate monetary translation, stability in the Middle East, security 
of supply of importing countries, pace of development of the Gulf States (Mabro, 2006). 
These secondary factors can themselves contribute to narrow the variation range of oil 
price. Before 1998, it had long been widely accepted that a ―political floor‖ at US$15/bbl 
was good compromise between the oil producing countries’ willingness to increase there 
revenues and the importing countries’ reluctance to aggravate their exposure to political 
disruption of their source of supply.    
  
 
2.6 Relationship between oil and gas prices 
 
For many years, fuel switching between natural gas and residual fuel oil kept natural 
gas prices closely aligned with those for crude oil.  More recently, however, the number of 
U.S. facilities able to switch between natural gas and residual fuel oil has declined, and over 
the past five years, U.S. natural gas prices have been on an upward trend with crude oil prices 
but with considerable independent movement (Brown, 2008).   
For many years, natural gas and refined petroleum products were seen as close 
substitutes in U.S. industry and electric power generation.  Industry and electric power 
generators switched back and forth between natural gas and residual fuel oil, using whichever 
energy source was less expensive. Consequently, U.S. natural gas price movements generally 
tracked those of crude oil. As shown by Yücel and Guo (Energy Journal, 1994), crude oil 
prices were shaped by world oil market conditions, and U.S. natural gas prices adjusted to oil 
prices. Over the past 10 years, however, the number of facilities able to switch quickly 
between natural gas and refined petroleum products has declined (Brown, 2008).  And, 
although U.S. natural gas prices have taken a general upward trend with crude oil prices over 
  
17 
the past five years, they also have shown considerable independent movement. Natural gas 
prices rose above what was seen as their historical relationship with crude oil prices in 2000, 
2002, 2003 and late 2005.  In the early 2005 and the first half of 2006, natural gas prices 
seemed to fall well below this historical relationship (Brown, 2008).   In apparent 
confirmation of these observations, Bachmeir and Griffin (2006) find only a weak relationship 
between oil and U.S. natural gas prices.  In contrast, a more recent study by Villar and Joutz 
(2006) finds oil and natural gas prices to be cointegrated with a trend. 
In a slightly different vein, Hartley, Medlock and Rosthal (2007) find that substitution 
between residual fuel oil and natural gas is particularly strong in the US North American 
Electric Reliability Council (NERC) regions where there is sufficient fuel-switching 
capability. 
Given the historical importance of substitution between natural gas and petroleum 
products, the energy industry has long time used rules of thumb to relate natural gas prices to 
those for crude oil. Two simple rules of thumb use constant ratios between natural gas and 
crude oil prices. One seems to fit historical data, and one roughly reflects the difference in 
energy content between the commonly sold units of oil and natural gas.  A third rule tries to 
relate parity in pricing of natural gas and residual fuel oil at the burner tip to prices for natural 
gas and crude oil at major trading hubs (Brown, 2008). 
One simple rule of thumb is the 10-to-1 rule under which the natural gas price is one-
tenth the price of crude oil price.  A price of $20 per barrel for West Texas Intermediate crude 
oil (WTI) would mean a natural gas price of $2 per million Btu at Henry Hub, and a $50 price 
would mean $5 natural gas (Brown, 2008).  
Another simple rule reflects the energy content of a barrel of oil.  Because a barrel of 
WTI contains 5.825 million Btu, some analysts have used a 6-to-1 rule, in which the price of a 
million Btu of natural gas ought to be roughly one-sixth the crude oil price.  Under this rule of 
thumb, a WTI price of $20 per barrel would mean a natural gas price of $3.33 per million Btu 
at Henry Hub, and $50 oil would mean $8.33 natural gas (Brown, 2008).  
A few analysts have interpreted the apparent transition from the 10-to-1 rule to the 6-
to-1 rule as indicative of improving market conditions for natural gas.  In fact, the apparent 
transition in pricing may reflect a more complex relationship between natural gas and oil 
prices.  Burner-tip parity is a more complex rule that takes in account competition between 
petroleum products and natural gas occurs where they are used—at the burner tip. Barron and 
Brown (1986) provide guidance for operationalizing burner-tip parity rules. For competition 
with residual fuel oil, the burner-tip parity rule takes into account the energy content of a 
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barrel of residual fuel oil, the long-run relationship between prices for residual fuel oil and 
West Texas Intermediate crude oil (WTI), and the higher costs of transporting natural gas 
from Henry Hub to market (Brown, 2008).  
A barrel of residual fuel oil has an energy content of 6.287 million Btu, and 
historically residual fuel oil is priced at 85 percent of WTI, which suggests a price of 
0.1511xPWTI  for a million Btu of residual fuel oil.  Barron and Brown report natural gas 
transportation differentials in a range of  $0.10-1.10 per million Btu from the wellhead to 
power plants and industrial users, but our examination of recent residual fuel oil prices and 
the Henry Hub price of natural gas prices shows an average transportation differential of 
about $0.5 (Brown, 2008).  Combining these elements, we obtain a pricing rule of thumb 
based on burner-tip parity as follows:  
                                                                                                
(1) 
where PHH  is the Henry Hub price of natural gas in dollars per million Btu and PWTI is the price 
of West Texas Intermediate crude oil (WTI) in dollars per barrel.  With this relationship, a 
$50 per barrel price for WTI would mean a natural gas price of $7.06 per million Btu at Henry 
Hub.  For these prices, a 150 percent increase in the oil price would mean a 180 percent 
increase in the natural gas price (Brown, 2008).  
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3 Models of the oil market 
3.1 The relevance of exhaustibility 
 
There is a finite amount of oil available on earth; how important is this scarcity in 
explaining the recent history of the market? 
A good exhaustible if greater consumption today implies less consumption tomorrow. The 
consequences of this intertemporal link were first studied formally by Hotelling (1931). 
Considering a competitive economy with perfect foresight and perfect capital markets, he 
showed that, in equilibrium, the difference between the price of an exhaustible good and 
its marginal cost of extraction is strictly positive and rises at the rate of interest. Even 
under perfect competition the price of an exhaustible resource would be different from its 
marginal cost of production (Crémer, 1996).   
Thus, even an exhaustible good that is costless to extract would command a posit ive price, 
which is the reward to the resource owners for having held to their stocks up to the present 
date. This difference between price and marginal cost is known as the ―scarcity rent‖.  The 
sum of the marginal cost of production and the scarcity rent is known as the ―user cost‖ 
(Crémer, 1996). 
Oil price increases have been attributed to scarcity and to monopoly depending on the 
analyst’s point of view. OPEC used exhaustibility as justification for the first price 
increase in 1973, in order to mollify the outcries against the resulting huge shift in the 
worldwide distribution of income. The Shah of Iran proclaimed oil too precious a resource 
to burn, and other OPEC spokesmen wished the world would thank them for reminding it 
of the rapid rate of depletion in petroleum reserves (Ortiz, 1982). 
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3.2 Models of monopoly behavior 
It is convenient to distinguish two basic variants of monopoly behavior: cartel and 
dominant firm theories. The cartel version is by far the most widely used to describe 
OPEC but, as it became increasingly clear, interactions within OPEC did not correspond 
to the classic cartel theory, the dominant firm version recently gained in acceptance 
(Crémer, 1996). 
3.2.1 The cartel model: theory 
Cartels are groups of producers who cooperate to reduce the quantity supplied of a 
commodity and thereby raise the price. As a consequence, price exceeds marginal cost, 
cartel members are kept to the left of their competitive supply curves and have incentives 
to increase sales through price discount. The cartel’s task to absorb the excess supply at 
the high price (AB in Figure 3.1) 
           Figure 3.1 Cartel model 
 
 
        
       Source: Crémer, 1996 
 
Pindyck (1978) contrasts a model in which OPEC behaves as a monopoly to one in which it 
behaves competitively. Pindyck modifies the standard monopoly model to take account of the 
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slow rate at which consumers adjust to a rapid increase in price. For example, in the long run, 
consumers may buy smaller cars and put more insulation in their homes, allowing them to 
reduce their demand for oil; in the short run, they are not able to make such adjustments (that 
is, long-run demand elasticities are greater than short-run elasticities) (Carlton, 2006). In 
Pindyck's monopoly model, OPEC's profit-maximizing strategy was to charge a high price 
initially (taking advantage of the slow rate of adjustment of net demand to higher prices), then 
to lower price through the 1970s, and then to raise it as the oil reserves were depleted 
(Carlton, 2006). 
Pindyck finds that to be successful a cartel must:  
- Determine a price and a production level for the group as whole. If the cartel does not 
include all the suppliers, this determination requires some calculation of the ―residual 
demand‖ left after subtracting from the market demand the supply of the producers 
that are not part of the cartel, the so-called ―competitive fringe‖ (Crémer, 1996). 
- Allocate output between members. If OPEC were run as a unified profit maximizing 
entity, it would produce mainly from the lower cost reserves in Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait and some form of redistribution of the profits to the other members would be 
necessary. In turn, those who would produce later would promise to pay part of their 
future profits to the early producers. Because such transfers are difficult to enforce, in 
any period all countries must generate their share of profits from the sales of their own 
products (Crémer, 1996). 
- Detect and punish cheaters.  
Description of  OPEC as a cartel came naturally to mind in 1973, when it decided to set price 
of oil unilaterally without negotiation with the international oil companies. 
 3.2.2 Dominant firm: theory 
In this family of models, all firms except one, the dominant firm, behave competitively. This 
firm computes its own demand curve, DDF, by subtracting the supply of the competitive 
fringe, SCF, from the market demand, DF, and then finds the maximum profit point, P1, on 
this derived demand curve (Figure 3.2). 
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Figure 3.2 Dominant firm model. Source: Crémer, 1996 
This is the Stackelberg equilibrium. In contrast to the cartel theory, in this version of 
monopolistic behavior all complications related to cooperative behavior are bypassed. The 
dominant firm faces a more elastic demand curve than a cartel that would include it, and 
would therefore choose a lower price. If its market share is very small, will be reversion to the 
competitive solution. 
Many people argue that Saudi Arabia acts as a dominant firm while many other OPEC 
countries are price takers. One problem with claiming that Saudi Arabia is a dominant firm is 
that its share of OPEC production rose from 23.98 percent in 1973 to 36.8 percent in 1980. 
Some of the increase in Saudi Arabia's share, however, may have been due to reduced output 
by warring OPEC nations (Carlton, 2006).  
A more sophisticated model holds that Saudi Arabia and a few other OPEC nations 
collectively act like a dominant firm and restrict output. While several OPEC countries have 
had substantial excess capacity in various years, it is generally believed that non-OPEC 
producers have had little excess capacity since 1973 (Griffin and Teece 1982, 29). For 
example, Adelman (1982) contends that a cartel core within OPEC (Saudi Arabia, the United 
Arab Emirates [UAE], Kuwait, Qatar, and Libya) has acted as a profit-maximizing dominant 
firm, facing a competitive fringe composed of non-OPEC producers (Carlton, 2006). Saudi 
Arabia has not reduced its output to the short-run profit-maximizing level because it fears that 
high prices speed the development of viable oil substitutes or induce consumers to make 
investments that allow them to purchase less oil, increasing the elasticity of demand for OPEC 
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oil in the future. Adelman argues that when oil prices are high, the cartel partially breaks 
down: Countries start to produce more and undersell each other (Carlton, 2006). The resulting 
fall in the price of oil induces Saudi Arabia (and, in some cases, other countries) to cut back 
production.  
3.3 Models of competitive behavior 
 
In the early 1980s several papers appeared arguing that OPEC was not a cartel because its 
members had no incentive to increase production at the high price. Benard (1980), Cremer 
and Salehi-Isfahani (1980), Scott (1981), and Teece (1982) all used the idea of absorptive 
capacity and imperfect capital markets to note that oil exporting countries had more revenues 
than they could spend (Crémer, 1996). 
The first serious statement of this theory by economists was by Crémer and Salehi-Isfahani 
(1989). MacAvoy (1982) also argues that the long-run trend in oil prices can be explained by 
a competitive model. Using a target-revenue model, Crémer and Salehi-Isfahani contend that 
the supply curve for oil is backward bending.  
 
Exporting countries try to achieve target revenue for internal investment purposes. Target 
revenue is set because the countries have limited capacity to absorb investment. For given oil 
price, fixing revenues determines output: there is no incentive to produce more oil (Carlton, 
2006).  
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Figure 3.3 Competitive Theory About OPEC 
 
 
Source: Crémer, 1996 
 
Figure 3.3, which is based on Crémer and Salehi-Isfahani's diagram, shows a backward-
bending supply curve with a demand curve that intersects it three times. In their explanation, 
the oil industry in early 1973 was at the low-price, competitive equilibrium (p1, Q1). In two 
steps (October 1973 and January 1974), the six Persian Gulf OPEC members agreed to raise 
prices, which caused a shift to the high-price equilibrium (p3, Q3) (Carlton, 2006). The 
equilibrium at (p2, Q2) is unstable. Were the quantity to fall slightly below Q2, the price 
would be above p2, but demand would be greater than supply. As a result, there would be 
upward pressure on the price, driving it towards p3. A similar argument holds that if the price 
fell below p2, it would continue to fall to p1. In contrast, the (p1, Q1) and (p3, Q3) equilibria 
are stable (Carlton, 2006).  
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3.4 Modeling production. Hotelling’s model  
In this section I will present the basic models of competition, monopoly and oligopoly that we 
can find in the literature. The theory for this chapter is taken from the lecture notes to 
Bjerkholt (2008) used in course ECON 4925. 
 A general result in Hotelling’s study (Hotelling 1931) is that along the optimal path the 
marginal net price, which is identical to the resource rent, should increase at the rate of 
discount. 
I will start with a simple model for free competition. Let S0 denote the total resource stock in 
the economy and Rt the total extraction at time t. Let’s assume that unit costs are constant and 
equal to b  and that the market price, taken as given by each producer, is tp . U(Rt) is utility of 
the consumption of the resource at time t (in money terms).                                                                      
The optimal extraction path for the society as a whole is found by maximizing 
(3.4.1) 
0
[ ( ) ] ,   0
T
rt
t t tU R bR e dt R
   
with respect to Rt, over a possibly infinite time horizon T][0, . Again, the maximization is 
constrained by the condition 
(3.4.2) 0
0
T
tR dt S  
The Hamiltonian is  
(3.4.3) ( , , , ) [ ( ) ] rtt t t t t t tH t S R U R bR e R 
    
The optimal extraction path must fulfill the following relation: 
(3.4.4)                             t
[ ( ) ]   (=  for 0)rtt t tU R b e R 
   
 
(3.4.5)                               0 constantt
H
S
  

    

   
Using that in a market economy with free competition, ( )t tU R p  . The shadow price of the 
resource stock at time t, λt, is in the present case, with extraction costs not depending on the 
accumulated production, constant. We have / 0H S   .  
(3.4.6) ( ) rttU R b e    
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The Hotelling rule for prices of exhaustible resources rtp b e  . 
Thus, a main conclusion in Hotelling's study was that in equilibrium the resource rent (the net 
price), defined as the difference between the market price of the resource and marginal 
extraction costs, must increase at a rate equal to the rate of interest.  
 I will solve now social planning problem for the optimal depletion profile for n identical 
natural resource firms. Let’s assume that there are n identical natural resource firms. The 
socially optimal rate of depletion is conceived as the rate that maximizes the gross surplus 
(consumers’ surplus plus producers’ surplus) derived from the demand function given as p(.). 
The amount depleted (per unit of time) from each firm at time t is Rt while the amount of 
unextracted resource in each firm at time t is St. The cost of extraction is given for each firm 
by the function b(Rt, St) with bR’ > 0,  bR’’ > 0 and bS’ < 0. The rate of discount is, r, the 
same for the social planning problem and in the competitive solution. 
(3.4.7) 
0 0
max [ ( ) ( , )]
t
t
nRT
rt
t t
R
p x dx nb R S e dt   
0,  ,  ,  0t t T tnS nR S S S S R      
The state variable in this problem is the amount of remaining resource nSt, while the control 
variable is the rate of depletion nRt. The current value Hamiltonian of this problem is – with 
shadow price  t - as follows:  
(3.4.8) ,
0
( , , ) ( ) ( , )
tnR
C
t t t t t t tH t nS nR p x dx nb R S nR     
Assume that St* and Rt* solves the problem. Then it follows from the maximum principle that  
Rt* maximizes the Hamiltonian, which implies that when continuity, differentiability and 
concavity of the Hamiltonian hold, we have 
(3.4.9) ( ) ( , ) 0
( )
C
t t t t
t
H
p nR b R S
nR


   

 
The rate of change of the shadow price in current values is given by 
(3.4.10) ( , )
( )
C
t t S t t
t
H
r b R S
nS
 

   

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Now consider the profit maximizing problem of one of the n firms facing a given price path 
(in fact the price path resulting from the given demand curve and the depletion of the n firms). 
We thus have the problem: 
(3.4.11) 
0
max [ ( , )]
t
T
rt
t t t t
R
p R b R S e dt  
0,  ,  ,  0t t T tS R S S S S R      
The current value Hamiltonian of this problem is  
(3.4.12) ( , , , ) ( , )C t t t t t t t t tH t S R p R b R S R     
Assume that St* and Rt* solves the problem. Then it follows from the maximum principle that  
Rt* maximizes the Hamiltonian, i.e. 
(3.4.13) ( , ) 0
C
t R t t t
t
H
p b R S
R


   

 
Furthermore, the rate of change of the shadow price in current values is given by  
(3.4.14) ( , )
C
t t S t t
t
H
r b R S
S
 

   

 
As the price pt is assumed to be p(nRt*), i.e. n identical firms producing the same amount,  
these conditions are exactly the same as in the social planning problem and in equilibrium t 
is equal to t. 
Hotelling thus derived conditions for the existence of equilibrium in markets for depletable 
resources. Theory does not tell how equilibrium is brought about. Neither does the theory give 
guidelines for the market development in cases where prices and quantities for some reason 
have reached values outside the equilibrium path. Strictly, market equilibrium in the Hotelling 
model requires the existence of future markets. Individual resource owners must have perfect 
foresight as to the evolution of net price of the resource, ( )tp b . Total extraction must also 
satisfy the end point conditions.   
(3.4.15)   0
0
T
tR dt S and   
max
0
rTp b e p b        , 
Where maxp  is choke price, price when demand is equal zero. 
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Hotelling’s model shows the extraction path. If the initial price is too high, there is too much 
conservation in early years and a part of the resource stock will be left in the ground at the time  
when the demand schedule reaches the choke price, pmax. If, on the other hand, p0 is too low, 
there is over-exploitation initially, and the resource stock will be depleted too early. There is also 
the possibility that in the latter case, the pressure against the resource stock, at a higher level of 
demand than along the optimal path, will induce the price of the resource to increase at a rate 
higher than what follows from the Hotelling’s rule.  
I am going to find how the resource market with one monopolist affects the optimal extraction 
how the Hotelling’s rule will be derived.  
Let’s assume there is no extraction cost. Monopolist is assumed to be faced by a downward 
sloping demand function, ( )p p y . From this demand schedule the marginal revenue is 
derived as   
(3.4.16)                                     
 d p y y
m p
dy

    , where )(1/-1=  ,  
  the elasticity of demand (in positive value).  
The objective for the monopolist is the same as for the competitive firms, i.e. maximizing 
discounted profits over a horizon that is also to be determined. By using the same kind of 
argument as in the Hotelling Rule we derive easily guess intuitively that optimal extraction, 
requires that marginal revenue increases at a rate equal to r when the production is non-zero. 
Formally, the equilibrium condition for the simple monopolist case is 
(3.4.17)                                        t
t
m
r
m

 
The equilibrium solution for a resource monopoly can be further illuminated by expressing 
(3.4.17) in the following way, still assuming zero unit cost: 
(3.4.18) ( ) ( )   
m p
m R p R r
m p



       
Relation (3.4.18) expresses the crucial role of the elasticity of demand when discussing 
monopoly equilibrium. If   is constant the monopoly case and competitive equilibrium case are 
identical, due to the dynamic nature of equilibrium concepts in the theory of exhaustible 
resources. Suppose the demand elasticity (in absolute value) increases as demand increases 
towards ―saturation‖. Then optimal path will be  
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(3.4.19) 
p
r
p
 
 This is because p  increases along the optimal path, this implies that 0 . The implication of 
monopoly behaviour is a higher price initially, and smaller production in an early part of the 
extraction period compared to a perfectly functioning competitive market. The fact that 
current extraction is restricted, forms the background for the statement that ―the monopolist is 
the conservationist's best friend‖.  
Now I will look at oligopolistic market with help of Hotelling’s theory. There are two groups 
of suppliers: a cartelized group and a competitive fringe. The latter consists of a number of 
identical producers. Each producer chooses quantity of output, taking market price as given. 
Market price is set up by dominant firm, who chooses the price to maximize own profit. The 
cartel's decisions, on the other hand, take into account both the demand reactions of the 
consumers and the behaviour of the competitive fringe. The cartel is assumed to behave 
strategically. In its price setting, it recognizes that the fringe reacts to the prices. Assuming 
perfect information, the cartel is accordingly able to calculate in detail how the fringe 
responds to any price profile that is announced.  
Here are characteristics of the equilibrium solution.  
 The cartel adjusts its extraction so that its marginal revenue increases at the rate of discount. 
Suppose   increases with p , this implies that the resource price increases at a rate less than r. 
On the other hand, fringe production requires equality between the rate of increase in the 
resource rent and the interest rate.  
 Only if unit costs of the fringe are significantly higher than the extraction costs of the cartel 
(sufficiently high to induce the cartel price path being steeper than the competitive price path) 
will the succession of production be turned around: the cartel takes control and supplies the 
market initially, while fringe production is held back for some time. While extracting, the 
marginal revenue of the cartel increases at the rate of interest.  
It is shown in Ulph (1982) that the equilibrium solution involves three phases, see Figure 3.4. 
In the first period ( 1[0, ]T ) the fringe supplies the market. At 1T  the resource stock of the fringe 
is emptied and the cartel takes over the market. For some time ( 1 2[ , ]T T ), however, the cartel 
follows a price and extraction policy that is a continuation of the competitive price path. Then, at 
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time 2T  the cartel adopts the price behaviour that corresponds to its de facto monopoly situation 
in the market, with marginal revenue increasing at rate equal to r. 
    Figure 3.4  Extraction path for cartel-fringe solution 
 
Source: Bjerkholt, 2008 
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4 Norway on the oil market 
4.1 Market overview 
 
Norway is currently the world’s third largest exporter of crude oil and the eighth 
largest oil producer. Norway is also the third largest exporter of natural gas, with significant 
long-term supply contracts to the European continent. The petroleum sector is Norway's 
single largest industry. In 2005, the petroleum sector accounted for 22.5% of Norway's GDP 
(annual GDP about USD 280 billion). Total investments in the Norwegian oil and gas 
industry in 2006 are projected at about USD 15.5 billion. The oil and gas industry in Norway 
is only offshore. There is no onshore production. The number of sub-sea, zero-surface 
projects is growing. Despite a large number of equipment suppliers in a very selective market, 
Norway continuously seeks new and proven technology for exploration and field 
developments in deep and remote northern waters.  
Norway is the world’s third largest exporter of crude oil behind Saudi Arabia and 
Russia, but ahead of Iran. Production of crude oil currently averages about 3 million barrels 
per day. Norway exports 90% of its oil production, accounting for nearly 50% of overall 
Norwegian exports. Norway is also the third largest exporter of natural gas behind Russia and 
Canada, but ahead of Algeria. Norway is ranked as the world’s seventh largest gas producer. 
Norway has significant long-term supply contracts by pipelines to the European continent.   
The petroleum sector has for the last three decades been a key driver for the 
Norwegian economy. It is the country’s single largest industry. It accounts for nearly three 
times the value generation of all other Norwegian industries.  
First exploration well on the Norwegian continental shelf was drilled by Ocean 
Traveler for 40 years ago. Very few envisaged in 1966 that this was the start of Norwegian oil 
and gas fairytale. There are 65 fields which have been put into production, and 13 of these are 
now closed down. Seven onshore facilities have been built. New technology has been 
developed and adopted in order to satisfy increasingly stringent demands on environmentally 
sound and safe activities, and to meet the challenges that have arisen as the most easily 
accessible resources have been produced.  
The trend has gone from building large steel and concrete platforms with processing 
plants, a permanent crew and many support functions, to developments based on sea-bed 
installations where the processing and control functions take place entirely from existing 
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installations or on land. This has also brought enhanced safety for the personnel and the 
environment (NPD, The Resource Report 2007).  
After 40 good and exciting years, it is the time to think about what the future may 
bring. Recent situation on the oil market can be characterized by high prices for oil and gas, a 
growing demand for Norwegian gas, increasing interest for exploration in the Barents Sea, 
record large response regarding allocations and many new companies wanting to get a 
foothold on the Norwegian continental shelf. At the same time, challenges, which face 
Norwegian oil industry, are declining oil production, rising costs, fewer and smaller 
discoveries. 
 
 4.2 Facts about production. Produced volumes 
Significant volumes remain to be produced and found on the Norwegian continental 
shelf. Only a third of the total resources have so far been produced, and a quarter of them 
have still not been discovered. Oil and gas prices are high at the moment, giving the industry 
and society in general good incentives to produce at a maximum rate. Oil production reached 
its peak a couple of years ago, but gas production is still increasing (NPD, The Resource 
Report 2007). Large volumes of oil and gas also remain in fields that are in production. Based 
on current plans, the average recovery factor for oil is expected to be 46 per cent. Continuous 
research and development of technology are required to raise this further. The authorities 
expect the companies on the Norwegian continental shelf to make a determined effort to 
ensure the highest possible recovery (NPD, The Resource Report 2007). 
The volume of the resources on the Norwegian continental shelf is uncertain. The 
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) estimates that between 1.6 and 5.8 billion Sm3 o.e. 
of oil, gas, condensate and NGL remain to be found. Their mean value is 3.4 billion Sm3 o.e. 
It is also uncertain how much of these resources the industry will gain access to (NPD, The 
Resource Report 2007). The areas that are now open for exploration are shown in Figure 4.1. 
Large areas have still not been opened; these are shown in red. 
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Figure 4.1  Status of petroleum activity on the Norwegian continental shelf 
 
 
                Source: Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
 
 The largest areas that are still not opened are in the North. The development here will be 
important for how much acreage will be available for exploration. In addition to concern for 
the environment and the fisheries, the relationship with Russia will be crucial.  
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The total recoverable resources are calculated to be between 10.6 and 16.9 billion standard 
cubic metre oil equivalents (Sm3 o.e.), with a mean value (base estimate) of 13.1 billion Sm3 
o.e. About a third (4.6 billion Sm3 o.e.) of the expected, recoverable petroleum resources 
have already been produced. More than three-quarters of the total production since the start in 
1971 have been oil, condensate or NGL (Natural Gas Liquids). The sale of gas, which began 
in 1977, is steadily increasing and in 2006 it accounted for 35 per cent of the total production 
(NPD, The Resource Report 2007). 
3.2 million Sm3 of oil have been produced from 57 fields. Production from nine of these 
fields has now ceased. The four large fields, Statfjord, Ekofisk, Oseberg and Gullfaks in the 
North Sea, account for half of the oil that is produced (NPD, The Resource Report 2007). 
Since 1994, these fields have stood for an increasingly smaller percentage of the total oil 
production (Figure 4.2).  
 
                  Figure 4.2. Oil production on various fields                                                                                                                                                                      
    
                         Source: Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
Nine oil fields have begun production in the last five years. As of 31 December 2006, 48 
fields were producing oil on the continental shelf. Eight of these produce more than 100 000 
barrels per day and account for more than half of the oil production (Figure 4.3). 
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              Figure 4.3 Oil fields arranged according to the oil production rate in 2006 
 
                 Source: Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) 
Norway exports 2542000 bbl/day.4 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 Oljemarkedet og Norge – www.regjeringen.no 
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4.3 Prices of crude oil. Changes in prices 
 
Petroleum activities started in Norway for 40 years ago and the price of oil has varied in this 
period from less than 3 dollars a barrel to the level of 145 dollars a barrel. Norwegian 
continental shelf has significantly higher cost than corresponding ones in other oil-producing 
countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran. In order exploration and recovery of oil and gas on the 
Norwegian continental shelf to be of interest, the prices have to be sufficiently higher than 
cover the costs. 
The present price of oil is at a historically high level (Figure 4.4). The companies have 
adjusted their price expectations upwards accordingly. According to the Cambridge Energy 
Research Association (CERA), the companies now use 40 dollars a barrel as the lower limit to 
test the robustness of the projects, whereas they recently applied 20 dollars (NPD, The 
Resource Report 2007). 
            Figure 4.4 Trend in the nominal price of Brent Blend oil 
 
                Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2006 
 
IEA presented reference scenario in World Energy Outlook 2006, it was based on a slightly 
rising oil price from 2012. An expected increase in the market share for a few oil-producing 
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countries and rising production costs outside the OPEC nations are reflected in this price 
trend. It assumed by IEA that in general the gas price will follow the trend in the price of oil 
since natural gas largely follows the oil price due to the oil-price index in sales contracts and 
because of considerable competition between different sources of energy in the end-user 
markets for natural gas (NPD, The Resource Report 2007). When the price of oil rises, 
exploration activity usually increases. A high oil price also leads to more developments and 
the implementation of more measures for improved recovery. At the same time, high prices 
stimulate more technological development. On the other hand, lower prices will give a 
reduction in exploration, fewer developments and less effort put into improved recovery and 
development of technology. (NPD, The Resource Report 2007). 
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5 Analysis of the data from Norwegian oil market 
To analyze how oil production related to oil prices I will compare first production volumes 
from years 1988 to 2008 and prices on Brend Blend for the same years.  Data is taken from 
Statistics Norway and is represented in Table 5.1.  
Table 5.1  Production volumes and prices on Brent Blend 
Year  Oil production, 1000 Sm3  Yearly average Brent Blend 
price, USD/barrel 
1988  64723  14,91 
1989  85983  18,02 
1990  94542  23,61 
1991  108510  20,19 
1992  123999  19,31 
1993  131843  17,08 
1994  146281  15,76 
1995  156776  16,98 
1996  175422  20,6 
1997  175915  19,13 
1998  168746  12,7 
1999  168690  17,9 
2000  181181  28,4 
2001  180884  24,4 
2002  173649  25,1 
2003  165475  28,7 
2004  162777  38,1 
2005  148137  53,5 
2006  136577  64,5 
2007  128277  72,2 
2008  122673  98,4 
Figure 5.1 represents total production of oil for years 1988-2008 and Figure 5.2 represents 
Brent Blend spot price.   
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                     Figure 5.1  Total oil production for years 1988-2008,  
                        1000 Sm3    
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                    Figure 5.3 Oil production and average Brent Blend price 
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According to the figure 5.3 there is no strong connection between oil production and yearly 
average Brent Blend price, but for the last 6 years oil production and average Brent Blend 
price tend to move in opposite directions. It is confirmed by correlation coefficient which is 
equal to -0,07877979 in this case. 
As we can see from Figure 5.1 peak of production falls on years 1996-2002. Highest 
production volume 181181000 Sm3 is extracted in 2000. The yearly average price for this 
year on Brent Blend was 28,4USD/barrel what is 62,3% higher than in 1999. Theory suggests 
that when the price of oil rises, exploration activity increases. But on the Figure 5.1 we can 
observe slightly decline in production despite increasing prices. The reaction on this increase 
is saying about difficulties to adjust production to oil prices. It would be reasonable to expect 
highest production at 4 last years, when the price of Brent Blend was climbing to 
145USD/barrel in 2008. But for 2008 the volume of oil production amounts only 122673000 
Sm
3
 almost the same as in 1992 when the yearly average price on Brent Blend was 
19,31USD/barrel. This shows how ―unsuccessful‖ Norway has been in relation to the price 
development. High cost of building platforms is a characteristic of Norwegian continental 
shelf. Because of that it is little flexible to adjust production to oil prices.              
There are different extraction costs, and for the case of pure competitive market it means that 
the oil reserves with the lowest extraction cost will be extracted first. In this case, according to 
the Hotelling’s theory, it will lower the initial gross price in the beginning of extraction, 
increase the rate at which the gross price increases (even though the net price increases at the 
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same rate as before according to the Hotelling’s rule), and shorten the time to complete 
exhaustion of the oil reserve. Norwegian oil production is characterized by high extraction 
cost so in the case of pure competitive market Norwegian reserves would be explored at last.    
What was the price expectation on Norwegian oil market when the exploration just started? 
When the oil exploration in Norway started, in an article in the periodical Norges Industri in 
1976, Kjell Stahl Johannesen, an oil expert, examined six cases. While this study is now out 
of date, it illustrates some of possible outcomes, using a variety of assumptions. Stahl 
Johannesen’s most optimistic price estimate (from a Norwegian point of view) called for a 10 
percent increase in oil prices every other year. The most pessimistic provided for a 10 percent 
increase in 1977 and no increases thereafter. Since the greatest unknown on the cost side is 
the cost of the development of Statfjord, Stahl Johannesen assumed in some models that it 
could cost 35 billion crowns (about $7 billion) and in others 50 billion (about $10 billion). He 
used government production estimates. With these variables, he concluded that the state’s 
income between 1976 and 1985 could vary from about 117 billion to about 193 billion crowns 
(about $23,4 to $38,6 billion).  
Let’s now analyze how the oil price has behaved since year 1988. The Hotelling rule suggests 
that the resource rent (difference between market oil price and marginal extraction cost) 
increases by the rate of interest (discount rate). But the price development on Figure 5.2 
points on deviation from the theoretical price. Thus the yearly average price on Brent Blend in 
1998 is 12,7 USD/barrel lower than in previous 1997 year (19,3 USD/barrel). Oil has been 
produced since the mid-1800s, and since then, prices have been stable for most of that time 
(with an exception to a period in the late 1970s and early 1980s). It wasn't until 2000 that oil 
prices began increasing more than the rate of interest and the gradual and predictable price 
path described by Hotelling. The reasons why the real price deviate from the theoretical price 
are changing demand for oil, backstop technologies (oil compete with other energy sources), 
changes in oil supply. Crude oil prices behave much as any other commodity with wide price 
swings in times of shortage or oversupply. The crude oil price cycle may extend over several 
years responding to changes in demand as well as OPEC and non-OPEC supply.  Let’s 
analyze the events which contributed to the development of oil prices. 
December 1986 OPEC price accord set to target $18 per barrel bit it was already breaking 
down by January of 1987and prices remained weak. The price of crude oil spiked in 1990 
with the lower production and uncertainty associated with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and 
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the ensuing Gulf War. Yearly average price on Brent Blend was 23,61$ per barrel. The world 
and particularly the Middle East had a much harsher view of Saddam Hussein invading Arab 
Kuwait than they did Persian Iran. The proximity to the world's largest oil producer helped to 
shape the reaction (Williams, 2007). 
Following what became known as the Gulf War to liberate Kuwait crude oil prices entered a 
period of steady decline until in 1994 inflation adjusted prices attained their lowest level since 
1973. Average price on Brent Blend in 1994 was 15,76$ per barrel. The price cycle then 
turned up. The United States economy was strong and the Asian Pacific region was booming. 
From 1990 to 1997 world oil consumption increased 6.2 million barrels per day (Williams, 
2007). Asian consumption accounted for all but 300,000 barrels per day of that gain and 
contributed to a price recovery that extended into 1997. Declining Russian production 
contributed to the price recovery.  
The price increases came to a rapid end in 1997 and 1998 when the impact of the economic 
crisis in Asia was either ignored or severely underestimated by OPEC.  In December, 1997 
OPEC increased its quota by 2.5 million barrels per day (10 percent). The rapid growth in 
Asian economies had come to a halt. In 1998 Asian Pacific oil consumption declined for the 
first time since 1982 (Williams, 2007). The combination of lower consumption and higher 
OPEC production sent prices into a downward spiral.   In response, OPEC cut quotas by 1.25 
million b/d in April and another 1.335 million in July. Price continued down through 
December 1998. Yearly average price on Brent Blend in 1998 was 12,7$ per barrel. 
Prices began to recover in early 1999 and OPEC reduced production another 1.719 million 
barrels in April. As usual not all of the quotas were observed but between early 1998 and the 
middle of 1999 OPEC production dropped by about 3 million barrels per day and was 
sufficient to move prices above $25 per barrel (Williams, 2007).  
With growing US and world economies the price continued to rise throughout 2000 to a post 
1981 high. Between April and October, 2000 three successive OPEC quota increases totaling 
3.2 million barrels per day were not able to stem the price increases. Prices finally started 
down following another quota increase of 500,000 effective November 1, 2000. 
 Russian production increases dominated non-OPEC production growth from 2000 forward 
and was responsible for most of the non-OPEC increase since the turn of the century 
(Williams, 2007).  Yearly average price on Brent Blend in 2000 was 28,4$ per barrel. 
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In 2001, a weakened US economy and increases in non-OPEC production put downward 
pressure on prices.  In response OPEC once again entered into a series of reductions in 
member quotas cutting 3.5 million barrels by September 1, 2001. In the wake of the attack 
crude oil prices plummeted. Spot prices for the U.S. benchmark WTI were down 35 percent 
by the middle of November. Under normal circumstances a drop in price of this magnitude 
would have resulted an another round of quota reductions but given the political climate 
OPEC delayed additional cuts until January 2002 (Williams, 2007). It then reduced its quota 
by 1.5 million barrels per day and was joined by several non-OPEC producers including 
Russia who promised combined production cuts of an additional 462,500 barrels. This had the 
desired effect with oil prices moving into the $25 range by March, 2002. By mid-year the 
non-OPEC members were restoring their production cuts but prices continued to rise and U.S. 
inventories reached a 20-year low later in the year (Williams, 2007).   
On March 19, 2003, just as some Venezuelan production was beginning to return, military 
action commenced in Iraq. Meanwhile, inventories remained low in the U.S. and other OECD 
countries. With an improving economy U.S. demand was increasing and Asian demand for 
crude oil was growing at a rapid pace.  
The loss of production capacity in Iraq and Venezuela combined with increased OPEC 
production to meet growing international demand led to the erosion of excess oil production 
capacity. In mid 2002, there was over 6 million barrels per day of excess production capacity 
and by mid-2003 the excess was below 2 million. In a world that consumes over 80 million 
barrels per day of petroleum products that added a significant risk premium to crude oil price 
and is largely responsible for prices in excess of $40-$50 per barrel (Williams, 2007).  
Other major factors contributing to the current level of prices include a weak dollar and the 
continued rapid growth in Asian economies and their petroleum consumption.  The 2005 
hurricanes and U.S. refinery problems associated with the conversion from MTBE as an 
additive to ethanol have contributed to higher prices.  
In 2008, after almost four years of climbing to the $145 pick, everybody was surprised with 
the sudden brutal downfall of the oil price to $30-40 (lowest prices so far — Brent spot last 24 
Dec. at $34.04). Many experts had predicted that oil would rise to $200 by the end of year 
2008, but according the peak oil theory, it was obvious that the rise could not last for long. 
Climbing phase of the oil prices is the result of the economy trying to adjust to increasing 
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costs of extraction (Rodrigues, 2008). High prices tell to the industrial system that it is 
necessary to invest more and more resources into oil prospection and extraction for 
maintaining production at the same level. At some point, however, the system reacts by 
contracting its demand for oil. At this point, prices collapse, too. That causes also production 
to contract and is the mechanism that generates the Hubbert peak (Rodrigues, 2008).  
The exact moment for the turning point couldn’t be predicted, but it was expected. As a 
reaction on this price situation OPEC recent cuts that amount to 4.2 million barrels a day 
(Mbd) from September production levels. They announced at Vienna, Austria, in October, a 
cut of 1.5 Mbd for November and December 2008 and 2.4 Mbd cut for January and February 
2009 (Rodrigues, 2008). It seems also that the Russians (second largest exporter, after Saudi 
Arabia) and the Azeris can announce export cuts of more than 600,000 barrels a day in an 
eventual political coordinated movement. Despite the vagaries of prices, the cost of oil 
extraction has been gradually increasing over the past years.  
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6. Conclusion 
It is inevitable that petroleum will continue to play the crucial role in satisfying the world’s 
energy requirements over at least the next two decades. Also, around four-fifth of all 
produced oil is exported. With this international outlook, the oil industry has already adjusted 
to many changes and grown used to the risks and benefits that a global market provides. 
Recent developments have presented new challenges to the way the oil industry, and oil 
producers, in particular, function in a truly globalized world. 
When viewing the market situation towards the end of 2008, it is clear that a combination of 
factors has been at work over the past years, leading to the persistent price rises and volatility. 
Oil market reveals oil’s centrality to global economic growth and mankind’s associated 
energy needs, its dynamic, constantly changing nature and its inherent volatility. At the same 
time, it underlines OPEC’s important role in seeking to achieve market order and stability, as 
successfully demonstrated and recognized in recent times. With capacity expansion plans 
under way in both OPEC and non-OPEC countries, ample crude supply should be available 
over the medium term. 
Over the long term, the next few decades are expected to see fossil fuels continue to account 
predominantly for increases in energy demand, with oil set to maintain its major role as a 
source of energy. There is also a clear expectation that the oil resource base is sufficiently 
abundant to satisfy this demand growth. Yet, the expected ranges of demand growth reveal 
large uncertainties in the absolute magnitudes of demand. Although non-OPEC production is 
seen as continuing its recent expansion over the medium term, it is generally agreed that 
OPEC will gradually be relied upon to supply the incremental barrel, with its market share 
eventually set to rise.  
Maintaining stable prices will be complicated by the uncertainties about the future, with 
regard to how demand will evolve, as well as how non-OPEC supply behaves. Uncertainties 
over future economic growth, consuming governments’ energy and environmental policies, 
and the rate of development and diffusion of newer technologies, raise questions over the 
future scale of required investment. This uncertainty, coupled with long lead times, inevitably 
complicates the task of maintaining market stability. The key to ensuring that sufficient 
investment takes place is oil market stability, whereby prices at reasonable levels need to be 
maintained to secure adequate sources of investment. 
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The future of the Norwegian oil adventure will be largely determined by the combination of 
the cost of producing oil and gas in the North Sea and the price of these commodities on the 
world market. World price of oil is established by a number of factors, none of which is 
subject to Norwegian control. The theoretical lower limit of the price of oil is established by 
the cost producing oil in the Middle East, plus the cost of shipping it to market. This is very 
low as compared with the cost of producing Norwegian oil. Nobody knows the upper limit of 
the world price of oil, but it is presumably set by the cost of alternative energy sources. 
However, it should never be forgotten that the present price of oil depends on the ability of 
the OPEC countries to hang together. 
In this work I did investigated mechanism of international oil market by giving the main 
features of historical development of oil market, economical fundamentals, market strategies 
for crude oil and relationship between oil and gas prices. In chapter three I described main 
theoretical models of the oil market: models of monopoly behavior, models of competitive 
behavior and Hotelling’s model.  In chapter four I showed main features which characterize 
Norwegian oil market: location of crude oil, facts about production and prices of oil.  
In chapter five I analyzed price development on Norwegian oil market and as we can see the 
real market oil price deviate from theoretical price ascertained by Hotelling’s rule. According 
to that the rate of change in resource price is directly related to the discount rate, so a lower 
rate of discount implies a less rapid increase in price. What are the reasons for deviation from 
the theoretical price? The possible price paths become diverse when exploration, capital 
investment, ore quality selection, market imperfections and other factors are taken into 
account. 
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